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NOTE

BURGER KING CORP. V. RUDZEWICZ:

A

WHOPPER OF AN OPINION

A pair of Michigan citizens invested in a Burger King franchise.
They filed their application with Burger King's Birmingham, Michigan,
district office, which then forwarded the application to the national
headquarters in Florida. In the course of negotiations, the franchisees
dealt with both offices, but their only physical contact with Florida was
through a brief training session which only one of them attended. In
addition, they purchased $165,000 worth of restaurant equipment which
was was shipped from Florida. The negotiations culminated in a contract
whereby the franchisees would pay Burger King one million dollars over
twenty years in return for a franchise in Michigan. Upon the failure of
the franchisees to make the required payments to the Florida office,
Burger King terminated the franchise. When the franchisees subsequently
refused to vacate the premises, Burger King filed suit in federal district
court in Florida alleging breach of franchise obligations and tortious
infringement of its trademarks. The franchisees argued that the claim
did not arise in Florida, and that therefore the Florida district court
lacked personal jurisdiction over them. On appeal to the Supreme Court,
Justice Brennan, writing for a majority of six members of the Court,
held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over these defendants did
not offend due process. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).

The facts in Burger King amply support its holding under prior
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. Nevertheless, certain language contained in the majority opinion is troubling.' Under the jurisprudence,
once minimum contacts were established the inquiry regarding personal
jurisdiction ended, because at that point the defendant had sufficient
connection with the forum to subject him to suit. The relationship under
examination was that of the defendant to the forum state. Various
factors were considered in determining whether the defendant-forum link
was strong enough to justify forcing a defendant to litigate in the forum
state. The primary considerations were: the purposeful availment re-
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quirement of Hanson v. Denckla;2 benefits received from the forum as
in Milliken v. Meyer;3 foreseeability of litigation in the forum as in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.4 Other factors have been
considered, each of which standing alone have been found insufficient
to support personal jurisdiction.'
In Burger King Justice Brennan wrote: "Once it has been decided
that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the
forum State, these contacts may be considered in light of other factors
to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and substantial justice. '6 This language suggests
that the traditional requirements of due process in the assertion of in
personam jurisdiction has changed. It appears that the analysis in Burger
King has turned the defendant-forum link into merely one factor to be
weighed equally with other factors, such as the location of the cause
of action, the inconvenience to the defendant, the interests of the forum
state, and the interests of the plaintiff. This test, then, focuses on the
relationship between the forum and the cause of action, necessarily
deemphasizing the relationship of the defendant with the forum, and
elevating those considerations previously given little weight.
Why is the shift of focus important? Such a shift in the analysis
could force defendants like those in World-Wide to litigate in Oklahoma.7
Such a shift in focus could force a Delaware bank to litigate in Florida,
a state wherein the bank had conducted no activity." By downplaying
the necessity of a defendant-forum link, "[e]very seller of chattels would
in effect appoint the chattel his agent for service of process.''
This note will examine the possibly substantial change that in personam jurisdiction has undergone through this apparent shift in focus,
including the lightening of the burden of proof necessary to bring
nonresident defendants into a forum which such a shift would effect.
Before this analysis can proceed, however, a brief examination of the
cases that established a strong defendant-forum relationship as the central
inquiry, as well as Justice Brennan's dissents in those cases, must be
undertaken.

2. 357 U.S. 235, 78 S. Ct. 1228 (1958). See text accompanying infra notes 18-24.
3. 311 U.S. 457, 61 S. Ct. 339 (1940). See text accompanying infra notes 12-14.
4. 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980). See text accompanying infra notes 25-32.
5. See text accompanying infra note 33.
6. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476, 105 S. Ct. at 2184 (emphasis added).
7. World-Wide, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980). For a discussion of the facts
of World-Wide, see text accompanying infra notes 25-32.
8. Hanson, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S. Ct. 1228 (1958). For a discussion of the facts of
Hanson, see text accompanying infra notes 18-24.
9. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 296, 100 S. Ct. at 566.
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Background
Any examination of the modern concept of in personam jurisdiction
must begin with International Shoe Co. v. Washington.'0 International
Shoe recognized that the "doing business" measure of activity established
by earlier cases begged the question of whether the activities of the
corporate defendant were sufficient under the limits of due process to
subject it to suit in the forum. Doing business was a quantitative measure
of the activity of the corporation or its agents; what was needed was
a qualitative standard by which to evaluate that measure. The Court
labelled that standard "minimum contacts":
[Djue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.""
The language "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" was taken from Milliken v. Meyer.'2 Milliken involved a suit against
a Wyoming domiciliary who, at the time of the suit, was absent from
Wyoming. The Court held that the Wyoming judgment was entitled to
full faith and credit in Colorado:
[T]he authority of a state over one of its citizens is not terminated
by the mere fact of his absence from the state. The state which
accords him privileges and affords protections to him and his
property by virtue of his domicile may also exact reciprocal
duties. . . .The responsibilities of that citizenship . . .[are] not
dissolved by mere absence from the state. The attendant duties,
like the rights and privileges incident to domicile, are not dependent on continuous presence in the state. 3 Under this analysis, the heart of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice" is the relationship the defendant has forged with the
forum state. The intentional relationship engendered by establishing domicile in a state makes it foreseeable that the state
could fairly call the absent domiciliary back to litigate within
its borders. A domiciliary receives benefits from his state, such
as the protection of its laws, and in return should be required
to accept certain responsibilities. To a lesser degree activities of

10. 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945).
11. InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S. Ct. at 158 (quoting Milliken, 311 U.S.
457, 463, 61 S. Ct. 339, 343).
12. 311 U.S. at 463, 61 S. Ct. at 343.
13. Id.at 463-64, 61 S. Ct. at 343.
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a non-domiciliary within a state invoke the same policies. 4 Because of this relationship (in Milliken a relationship of citizenship), it is fair to call the nonresident defendant to litigate in
the forum.
In personam jurisdiction cases after International Shoe recognized
the problems presented by corporate defendants, and adopted a standard
with which to deal with such non-resident parties when they were willing
to engage in activity in a state, but were not willing to be sued in that
state. An example of this is McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co."5
In McGee, International Life Insurance, a Texas corporation, had taken
over Empire Mutual with whom the California decedent had a life
insurance policy. International Life offered to insure the decedent with
a new policy on the same terms, but with premiums to be mailed to
the Texas office. Upon the death of the insured, the beneficiary of the
policy filed a claim, which International Life refused to pay. The beneficiary then filed suit in California against International Life, obtained
a judgment, and sought enforcement of the judgment from a Texas
court. The Texas court refused to enforce the California judgment,
based on a finding that, because service of process on the defendant
occurred outside of California, California lacked personal jurisdiction.
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that California did have jurisdiction, and held for the beneficiary.
The only contact the defendant had with California was the one
insurance policy at issue. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that, because
International Life had sought out the California resident and established
a contract with him for its economic benefit, "[i]t . . . [was] sufficient
for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which
had substantial connection with that State. '1' 6 In so concluding, the
Court saw itself as allowing in personam jurisdiction the flexibility needed
to cope with the "increasing nationalization of commerce. 117 Built into
this new flexibility was the concept of foreseeability: the defendant had
solicited the insured's business in California and should have been able
to foresee that if a dispute were to arise it would probably be sued
upon in California. Moreover, the defendant received the financial benefit of premium payments from California, which made it fair to shoulder
the defendant with the burden of defending there.

14. International Shoe broadened the relationship concept in Milliken from that of
domicile to one based on benefits received from the forum state, by applying the Milliken
rationale to a corporation.
15. 355 U.S. 220, 78 S. Ct. 199 (1957).
16. Id. at 223, 78 S. Ct. at 201.
17. Id.
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Hanson v. Denckla5 stands for the proposition that the defendant
must purposefully avail himself of the benefits of the forum state in
order for the forum to assert personal jurisdiction. Hanson involved a
trust set up at a Delaware bank by a Pennsylvania resident (the testator)
who later became a Florida resident. When the testator died in Florida,
a dispute arose over the trust funds. The Florida court held that it had
jurisdiction over the Delaware bank. The Supreme Court held that
Florida did not have jurisdiction: "The defendant trust company has
no office in Florida, and transacts no business there. None of the trust
assets has ever been held or administered in Florida, and the record
discloses no solicitation of business in the State either in person or by
mail." 9 The only contact of the Delaware bank with Florida was in
the form of communications received from the testator. On the basis
of these facts, the Court concluded:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with
a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact
with the forum State. The application of that rule will vary
with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but it
is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendantpurposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State thus invoking the benefits and
20
protections of its laws.
In Hanson, the majority felt there was not a sufficient connection
between the defendant and the forum to establish a relationship upon
which personal jurisdiction could be based, since there was no purposeful
2
and deliberate activity by the defendant. '
It should be noted that Florida had a substantial interest in resolving
the dispute. The will was probated and the power of appointment of
the trust executed in Florida. Under Florida law the appointment was
invalid. Moreover, the appointment was performed by a Florida resident.
In spite of the strength of these interests, the Court refused to extend
personal jurisdiction over a party which had not directed its activity at
the forum.

18. 357 U.S. 235, 78 S. Ct. 1228 (1958).
19. Id. at 251, 78 S. Ct. at 1238.
20. Id. at 253, 78 S. Ct. at 1239-40 (emphasis added).
21. In this context, the Court has often found such activities to be those which
involve a commercial benefit or a tort. Such actions by their very nature allow parties
to anticipate suit in the forum. See, e.g., McGee, 355 U.S. 220, 78 S. Ct. 199 (1957);
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 464 U.S. 958, 104 S.Ct. 1473 (1984); Calder v. Jones,
465 U.S. 783, 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984).
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The dissenting opinion in Hanson22 was written by Justice Black
and joined by Justices Brennan and Burton. Black's dissent foreshadowed
Brennan's dissent in World-Wide:
It seems to me that where a transaction has as much relationship
to a State as Mrs. Donner's appointment had to Florida its
courts ought to have power to adjudicate controversies arising
out of that transaction, unless litigation there would impose such
a heavy and disproportionate burden on a nonresident that it
would offend what this Court has referred to as "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."" a
The dissent also focused on the business relationship between the testator
and the Delaware bank that continued until her death. Unlike the
majority, the dissent viewed the maintenance of that business relationship
as a deliberate action by the defendant, which, when coupled with the
forum's interest in handling the litigation involving a will to be executed
in that state, supported an assertion of personal jurisdiction.
Brennan's position became more clear in World-Wide, 24 which involved an attempt by an Oklahoma court to assert jurisdiction over a
New York wholesaler and a New York retail dealer. The only connection
that these two defendants had to the forum was by virtue of the
automobile that had been involved in the accident upon which the
litigation was based. Justice White, writing for the majority, found that
the "fortuitous circumstance that a single Audi automobile, sold in New
York to New York residents, happened to suffer an accident while
passing through Oklahoma"' ' was not sufficient to support the assertion
of personal jurisdiction.
The majority developed an analysis giving the non-resident defendant
the power to structure his activity so as to avoid suit in the forum.
Part of its analysis lay in the concept of foreseeability:
[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is
the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into
forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct
connection with the forum State are such that he should
26
sonably anticipate being haled into court there.

not
the
and
rea-

Such foreseeability allows the defendant the ability to spread the costs
of litigation either by buying insurance, "passing the expected costs on

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Hanson, 357 U.S. at 256, 78 S. Ct. at 1241 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 258-59, 78 S. Ct. at 1242 (emphasis added) (Black, J.,dissenting).
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980).
Id. at 295, 100 S. Ct. at 566.
Id. at 297, 100 S. Ct. at 567.
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to customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with
27
the State.''
An important distinction arose in World-Wide between movement
of goods in the stream of commerce and movement by consumers. The
essence of this distinction lies in the control over the product and the
benefit derived from the presence of the product in the forum. Under
the majority's view, if a product is placed into the stream of commerce
by the defendant for a commercial benefit, the defendant who realizes
a profit from that movement, and thereby benefits from the product's
location in the forum, must accept the risk of litigation wherever he
sent the product. It would only be fair for that defendant to accept
that risk, because he has the ability to anticipate the possibility of suit
there and to protect himself by spreading the risk. He could, for instance,
buy insurance and pass the costs on to the consumer.
On the other hand, when the consumer is responsible for the movement of the product, the retailer/wholesaler/producer has no method
by which to control the risk to which such movement exposes him. In
such a case, "[e]very seller of chattels would in effect appoint the chattel
his agent for service of process. His amenability to suit would travel
with the chattel." 28 In addition, the two factors in Milliken (foreseeability
29
arising from an intentionally created relationship and benefits received),
which justified calling the nonresident to litigate in the forum, are not
present. According to the majority, if a product is moved by the consumer, the manufacturer cannot be said to foresee litigation in the place
of removal, because he lacks knowledge of the location of the product.
Moreover, if the product is removed to an unknown forum, it is difficult
to determine what benefits that state then gives to the manufacturer.
In the majority's view, the defendants did not receive any benefit from
the car's presence in Oklahoma, nor could it be said that the defendants
could foresee the creation of a relationship with Oklahoma which would
result in litigation there.
Justice Brennan's strong dissent evidenced his different view of the
protections afforded by due process. For Brennan, the defendant's act
of putting the automobile into the flow of commerce established a
sufficient connection with the state into which the automobile was driven
upon which to base jurisdiction. After stating that the majority read
InternationalShoe too narrowly, he attacked the weight given the defendant-forum connection. He then stressed the importance of other factors,
such as benefits which the defendant derives from the forum, the interests
of the forum in the litigation, and inconvenience to the defendant of

27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id. at 296, 100 S. Ct. at 566.
See text accompanying supra notes 12-13.
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litigating in the forum. In a footnote, Brennan explained his viewpoint:
The forum's interest in the litigation is an independent point of
inquiry even under traditional readings of International Shoe's
progeny. If there is a shift in focus, it is not away from "the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation."
Instead it is a shift within the same accepted relationship from
the connections between the defendant and the forum to those
between the forum and the litigation.?
Under his understanding of the traditional defendant-forum analysis,
Brennan would have held the defendant in World-Wide amenable to
jurisdiction. He argued that an automobile is a product that is purchased
because of its mobility; accordingly, the defendants were benefitting
from the use of this product in Oklahoma. Moreover, the defendants
clearly benefitted from a national system of advertising and service
centers, some of which were located in Oklahoma.
Justice Brennan's approach to personal jurisdiction stresses the forumcause of action relationship. According to his dissent in World-Wide,
if a plaintiff can "show that his chosen forum State has a sufficient
interest in the litigation (or sufficient contacts with the defendant), then
the defendant who cannot show some real injury to a constitutionally
protected interest . . . should have no constitutional excuse not to appear."
In the first step of this analysis, two different inquiries are
raised, either of which when met satisfies this step. The first inquiry
examines the forum state's interest in the litigation; the second evaluates
the defendant's contacts with the forum state.
This approach is different from that taken in International Shoe
and its progeny under which personal jurisdiction was based on the
defendant-forum relationship, the purpose of which was to protect the
defendant from being subjected to a suit in a forum with which he had
no connection. As discussed earlier, such protection allowed a potential
defendant knowingly to control his activities toward a forum in such a
way as to influence his amenability to personal jurisdiction in that forum.
Prior jurisprudence did not require an initial inquiry of whether either
the forum state had sufficient interest in the litigation to justify suit in
that state or the defendant's relationship with the forum was sufficient.
In fact, the World-Wide majority expressly repudiated the use of other
factors to downplay the defendant-forum connection:

30. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. at 302 n.4, 100 S. Ct. at 582 n.4 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis in the original). The footnote is in Justice Brennan's
-dissenting opinion in Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 302, 320, 100 S. Ct. 571, 580 (1980),
in which he combined his dissents in both Rush and World-Wide.
31. 444 U.S. at 312, 100 S.Ct. at 587 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
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Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience
from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another
State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying
its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most
convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting
as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to
32
divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.
The Burger King Opinion
As mentioned earlier, Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Burger
King suggests that the defendant-forum relationship is merely one factor
in the analysis. This break from the jurisprudence first appeared in
Black's dissent in Hanson and was elaborated on in Brennan's dissent
in World Wide. It thus appears that Brennan wove into Burger King
a thread of analysis that the prior jurisprudence had rejected.
Considering its facts in light of the jurisprudence, Burger King is
not a radical decision. The contract involved had a substantial connection
with the plaintiff's Florida headquarters. Moreover, the contract contained a clause that stated that Florida law would govern any disputes.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the situation was the foreseeability
of possible litigation in a forum where the franchisees had a substantial
contractual tie. The strong connection of the defendants to the forum
through being parties to a contract involving a substantial sum of money
to be paid over a period of twenty years fits easily under the traditional
defendant-forum test.
After setting out the facts, Brennan wrote that due process was
intended to protect liberty interests, then, citing earlier decisions, discussed the need for the defendant purposefully to avail himself of the
benefits of the forum. Brennan tracked the prior jurisprudence and then
purported to set out the traditional analysis for assertion of personal
jurisdiction, which he said involves the establishment of minimum contacts before consideration of other factors. At this point some type of
analytical jump was made. Prior jurisprudence required the consideration
of all factors to determine whether there were minimum contacts, which
was the equivalent of there being sufficient connection of the defendant
with the forum to justify forcing the defendant to litigate there. The
impact of considering other factors after minimum contacts has been
established is not clear, especially since the result in BurgerKing probably
would have been no different under the traditional analysis. Nevertheless,
it can be argued strongly that the use of minimum contacts as merely
one factor in the analysis reduces the importance of the relationship of

32.

Id. at 294, 100 S. Ct. at 565-66.
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the defendant with the forum. If one considers the previous dissents by
Justice Brennan, it would appear that, in Burger King, he was referring
to the two-step test that he developed in World-Wide.33 The effect of
such a test is, in fact, to downplay the defendant-forum connection by
weighting other factors equally with it.
At this point, a very basic question must be asked: what purpose
does due process protection serve in the context of jurisdiction over the
person? Pennoyer v. NefP4 established the basic rule of personal jurisdiction upon the premise that due process serves as a check on state
sovereignty:
The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the
territorial limits of the State in which it is established. Any
attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits would be deemed
in every other forum, as has been said by this court, an illegitimate assumption of power, and be resisted as mere abuse.35
However, World-Wide appeared to characterize due process protection as an element of interstate federalism: "It protects the defendant
against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.
And it acts to ensure that the States through their courts, do not reach
out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal
36
sovereigns in a federal system."
7
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee1
addressed and dismissed the World-Wide view of the role of due process
in the context of jurisdiction over the person.38 The crux of its language
was used by the Burger King court.3 9 The Court in Insurance Corp.
found that while due process protection does serve to restrict state power,
40
its ultimate function is the protection of individual liberty interests.
According to Burger King, due process "protects an individual's
liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum
with which he has established no meaningful 'contacts, ties, or relations."' 4' The opinion goes on to say that such protection allows potential
defendants to structure their activities so as to provide "some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable
to suit." ' 42 It appears, then, that after Insurance Corp. and Burger King

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See text accompanying supra note 32.
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
Id. at 720.
444 U.S. at 291-92, 100 S. Ct. at 564.
456 U.S. 694, 102 S.Ct. 2099 (1982).
Id.at 702 n.10, 102 S.Ct. at 2104 n.10.
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471-72, 472 n.13, 105 S. Ct. at 2181-82, 2181 n.13.
456 U.S. at 702-03 n.10, 102 S. Ct. 2099, 2104-05 n.10.
471 U.S. at 471-72, 105 S. Ct. at 2181-82.
Id.at 472, 105 S.Ct. at 2182.

1987]

NOTE

the accepted primary purpose of due process is the protection of individual liberty interests.
The important question raised by the foregoing is whether it would
be possible for jurisdiction to be asserted in the absence of a defendantforum link if the other Burger King factors were present. If Burger
King indicates a trend toward the adoption of the position taken by
Brennan in his previous dissents, 43 an affirmative answer is suggested.
What should the answer be? The answer should be consistent with the
purpose underlying due process protection. Since a crucial component
of due process is the protection of individual liberty interests, if the
nonresident defendant directs his actions at the forum, it is fair to force
him to litigate in the forum because his liberty interests have properly
been taken into account. Moreover, such direction of activity should be
analyzed in conjunction with the benefit that the defendant receives from
the forum and the foreseeable possibility of litigation in the forum.
If, however, the defendant-forum link is merely one factor to be
considered, the defendant loses the minimum assurance as to where he
could be sued. If other factors can make personal jurisdiction possible
in the absence of a defendant-forum link established by direct actions
of the defendant, the system of personal jurisdiction established by
InternationalShoe and its progeny crumbles. Moreover, if, as has been
suggested, the defendant-forum link is at the heart of the primary
purpose of due process in this context-i.e., protection of the defendant's
liberty interests-then the elevation of other considerations would appear
to be self-defeating. Nonetheless, this is precisely what Justice Brennan's
opinion in Burger King does.
Recent Application of Burger King
A recent decision of the Supreme Court supports the interpretation
of Burger King offered in this article. Asahi Metal Industry v., Superior
Court" involved the assertion of jurisdiction over a Japanese manufacturer in an indemnification action by a Taiwanese distributor who had
been held liable in a products liability suit in California. The Supreme
Court of California found the assertion of jurisdiction over the manufacturer constitutional. All of the members of the United States Supreme
Court agreed that the assertion of jurisdiction would offend due process,
but their agreement as a majority extended no further.

43. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 256, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 1241 (1958) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 101, 98 S. Ct. 1690, 1701 (1978)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 299,
100 S. Ct. at 580 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. 55 U.S.L.W. 4197 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1987).
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Justice O'Connor wrote part II A of the opinion, in which only
three other justices joined. Her decision was based on a finding that
the defendant had made no deliberate, purposeful attempt to avail itself
of the California market. She distinguished between the mere knowledge
of the manufacturer that his product would reach a certain market and
what she considered deliberate activity: e.g., designing a product for a
particular market, advertising in that state, or marketing the 45product
through a distributor acting as the manufacturer's sales agent.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun,
disagreed with that analysis. They found the regular and systematic
placement of over one hundred thousand units of the manufacturer's
product into the stream of commerce, coupled with the knowledge that
some of the units would end up in California, to be sufficient for the
assertion of jurisdiction. Brennan noted that the manufacturer could not
claim surprise over being called to California because of its awareness
that its product would end up there. Additionally, the manufacturer
received substantial revenues over several years from the retail sale of
its product in California. 46
Eight of the members of the Court (all but Justice Scalia) agreed
that, upon consideration of other factors after considering the defendantforum connection, assertion of jurisdiction was not constitutional. Justice
O'Connor considered those factors which Justice Brennan, in Burger
King, said should be considered in light of the defendant-forum connection. She noted that the burden on the Japanese manufacturer would
have been excessive; it would have had to defend a suit across the ocean
and have a foreign law determine the rights between it and a Taiwanese
distributor. Secondly, the forum had little interest in pursuing an indemnity action between two foreign corporations. In addition, the Taiwanese distributor, plaintiff in the indemnity action, failed to demonstrate
any interest in having its suit tried in California as opposed to Taiwan
or Japan. Finally, the Court was aware that more restraint is required
when dealing with foreign countries than with the several states. All of
these considerations rendered assertion of jurisdiction over Asahi offen47
sive to "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Burger King's impact on Asahi is evident. Justice O'Connor considered first the defendant-forum connection and then considered other
factors. Had she and the three justices joining her felt that, without
the requisite defendant-forum connection, assertion of personal jurisdiction was unconstitutional, there would have been no need to go any

45.
46.
47.
quoting

Id. at 4199.
Id. at 4200 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
Id. at 4200 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S. Ct. at 158,
Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463, 61 S. Ct. at 343).
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919

further. Yet, she considered the burden on the defendant and interests
of the plaintiff and the forum, just as Justice Brennan advocated in
Burger King. Once again the question arises as to whether a strong
interest of the forum state and the plaintiff, along with little inconvenience to the defendant, but without deliberate activity in the forum on
the part of the defendant, would support a finding of personal jurisdiction. In light of Burger King and Asahi, it may.
John C. Davidson

